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Introduction 
 The two most powerful battle fleets in the world—the British Grand Fleet and the 
German High Seas Fleet—departed their bases for what would become the largest naval battle of 
the First World War on 30 and 31 May 1916, respectively.
1
 The German fleet had previously 
conducted a series of raids on the eastern British coast in an attempt to lure out a portion of the 
numerically superior Grand Fleet and destroy it.
2
 The British, however, had acquired the primary 
German naval code book in 1914 from the cruiser SMS Magdeburg, after it ran aground in the 
Gulf of Finland and was captured by the Russian navy.
3
 The ability to intercept and decrypt 
German radio traffic provided the British with valuable early warnings of major fleet actions. 
Aware that the German fleet was to sail on the 31
st
 on yet another such raid, the British decided 
to sortie their fleet a day early in order to be in position to cut off their opponent from its bases in 
Germany.
4
  
 The main German fleet was composed of 16 dreadnought battleships and six pre-
dreadnought battleships
 
 under the command of Vice Admiral Reinhard Scheer.
5
 A scouting 
force of five battlecruisers,
6
 commanded by Rear Admiral Franz von Hipper, screened the battle 
fleet.
7
 The main British fleet, commanded by Admiral John Jellicoe, consisted of 24 
dreadnoughts and three battlecruisers. Vice Admiral David Beatty's 1
st
 and 2
nd
 Battlecruiser 
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Squadrons, totaling six ships, along with Rear Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas's 5
th
 Battle Squadron 
of four fast battleships, scouted for Jellicoe.
8
 Both fleets were accompanied by cruisers of 
various types and dozens of destroyers.
9
 
 The battle began shortly before 1600 UTC,
10
 when the British and German battlecruiser 
forces encountered each other.
11
 The Germans turned south in an attempt to lure the British 
towards the main German fleet.
12
 Admiral Hipper's ships, though they were out-ranged by the 
three leading British battlecruisers, fired first. The British 5
th
 Battle Squadron was several miles 
astern of Beatty's battlecruisers, and as a result of communication errors failed to follow Beatty's 
turn to the south.
13
 By 1630, German heavy shells had penetrated ammunition magazines in two 
of Admiral Beatty's ships, HMS Indefatigable and Queen Mary; the resulting magazine 
explosions tore both vessels apart and caused tremendous casualties. In the same span of time, 
HMS Lion, Beatty's flagship, nearly met the same fate. The British squadron was now heavily 
disadvantaged; however, Evan-Thomas' battleships quickly closed the distance and tilted the 
balance back in favor of the British.
14
 
 At approximately the same time, Admiral Scheer's battleships arrived on the scene. At 
1640, Beatty turned northward to lure the German fleet towards the main body of the Grand 
Fleet.
15
 The 5
th
 Battle Squadron, still trailing behind Beatty's battlecruisers, bore the brunt of the 
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fire from the German battleships and battlecruisers during this portion of the battle.
16
 Shortly 
after 1800, the three ships of the 3
rd
 Battlecruiser squadron arrived to reinforce Beatty's ships.
17
 
During this segment of the engagement, the newly arrived British ships inflicted fatal damage on 
the German battlecruiser SMS Lützow, which forced it to withdraw from the action.
18
 At the 
same time, however, Lützow's and Derfflinger's combined fire destroyed the battlecruiser 
Invincible.
19
 The Grand Fleet reached the battle at approximately the same time and began to 
deploy to the east of the German fleet shortly thereafter.
20
 
 At 1830, Scheer realized that the entire British battle fleet confronted him, and ordered a 
simultaneous 180-degree turn that brought his ships on a westerly course.
21
 Jellicoe, fearful of 
German torpedoes, decided to turn southward to maintain his ability to cut off any German 
attempt to break for the safety of their bases.
22
 Just before 1900, Scheer turned his ships back to 
the east in an attempt to surprise the British, but the Germans found themselves facing Jellicoe's 
entire deployed line of battle. Scheer ordered the battle fleet to make another turn to the west; he 
directed the four remaining German battlecruisers and a torpedo-boat flotilla to charge the 
British line to cover the retreat. Between 2020 and 2035, the last major clash of the battle took 
place between the battlecruiser squadrons. Beatty had been able to catch up to Hipper's battered 
ships, though the German pre-dreadnoughts intervened and covered Hipper's withdrawal to the 
south.
23
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 As darkness fell, both fleets assumed night cruising formations. A series of clashes 
between both sides' light forces and the German battle fleet occurred throughout the night.
24
 
Lützow had withdrawn by this time with a handful of escorting torpedo boats; the ship continued 
to take on water and was eventually scuttled in the early morning hours of 1 June.
25
 Jellicoe was 
unsure of the exact disposition and location of the German fleet and was aware that the German 
crews had been trained more thoroughly than the British crews for night fighting. He therefore 
decided to avoid battle until dawn. As a result, Scheer was able to punch through the British 
destroyer screen in the darkness and make good his escape.
26
  
 Over the course of the battle, three British battlecruisers and three armored cruisers were 
sunk, along with eight destroyers. German losses totaled one battlecruiser, one pre-dreadnought 
battleship, four light cruisers, and four torpedo-boats. British losses were higher in terms of ships 
lost and men killed, but they retained control over the North Sea and were still able to impose a 
crippling naval blockade of Germany.
 27
 
 The two fleets were not to engage each other again for the remainder of the war; an 
abortive advance into the North Sea by the German fleet followed on 18–19 August 1916,28 and 
a second took place on 10 October.
29
 The third and last post-Jutland fleet action took place on 23 
April 1918. The operation was abandoned after the battlecruiser SMS Moltke suffered 
mechanical problems during the sail northward.
30
 Admirals Scheer and Hipper planned a final 
sortie for 30 October 1918 that would have attempted to lure the British fleet south for a fight to 
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the death. Hipper ordered the German fleet to assemble in Wilhelmshaven three days before. The 
ships' crews, whose morale had steadily declined due to inaction and a desire for peace, wanted 
no part in a glorious death for the Kaiser. Hundreds of sailors deserted, conducted peace 
demonstrations, and openly mutinied against their commanders; the crews of several of the ships 
refused to sail. The operation was canceled and the fleet was dispersed.
 31
 Ultimately, the 
majority of the High Seas Fleet was interned by the British at Scapa Flow; fearing the ships 
under his command would be seized as war reparations, Rear Admiral Ludwig von Reuter 
ordered them to be scuttled on 23 June 1919.
32
 
 After receiving the news that the battlecruisers HMS Indefatigable and Queen Mary had 
been destroyed by magazine explosions in the early part of the Battle of Jutland, Vice Admiral 
David Beatty made the famous remark, "There is something wrong with our bloody ships 
today."
33
 Little did he know, design flaws were not the only cause for the catastrophic 
explosions, nor were they limited solely to the British ships, though their German rivals did not 
suffer from the same fatal shortcomings that plagued the Grand Fleet battlecruisers. The British 
reconnaissance force suffered from a number of serious problems, among them insufficient 
armor protection, less effective gunnery than their German opponents―mainly from lack of 
training―and defective main battery projectiles.34 These flaws were of secondary importance 
compared to the dangerous ammunition handling techniques practiced aboard the British ships, 
and these were what ultimately led to the destruction of three of Beatty's battlecruisers. 
                                                          
31
 Tarrant, op. cit., 281–282 
32
 Holger Herwig, "Luxury" Fleet: The Imperial German Navy 1888-1918. (Amherst, New York: Humanity Books, 
1980), 256 
33
 Halpern, op. cit., 319 
34
 The poor quality of British long-range gunnery is discussed in Appendix III and the problematic armor-piercing 
shells are examined in detail in Appendix II. 
6 
 
 The German battlecruisers, though more stoutly constructed than their British 
counterparts, were not without weaknesses. A chief design fault was the torpedo bulkhead, which 
did not run the entire length of the hull.
35
 The "soft ends" this system created were among the 
primary reasons the flooding aboard SMS Lützow, Vice Admiral Franz von Hipper's flagship, 
could not be controlled. The German ships were also equipped with lighter main batteries; while 
the guns were sufficiently powerful to penetrate the thinner armor of their British rivals, the 
maximum effective range of these guns was significantly lower than the larger guns of the Tiger 
and three Lion class ships. This turned out to be less of a handicap than might have been 
expected. Mistaken assumptions about the distance between the two squadrons and questionable 
decision-making by Vice Admiral Beatty caused him to hold his fire until after his German 
opponents had already reached effective gunnery range, and in doing so he discarded a crucial 
advantage. 
 Among the advantages enjoyed by the Germans were better-trained gun crews and more 
effective main battery ammunition, which allowed them to inflict serious damage early in the 
engagement. The German gunners also had more favorable conditions in the beginning of the 
battle. The ships' thicker armor also enabled them to take a heavier beating than their British 
opponents. Another sometimes overlooked advantage was the shorter distance from the battle 
area to German ports, compared to the distance to the fleet bases in northern Britain. The 
severely damaged SMS Seydlitz was able to limp back to Wilhelmshaven; it is questionable as to 
whether a similarly damaged British ship would have been able to make the longer voyage back 
to Scapa Flow or Rosyth. 
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 Despite the design imperfections present in the ships of both forces, the most important 
difference between the British and German ships, and the primary reason the British suffered 
greater casualties during the battle, was the difference between the respective sides' propellant 
charges and gun handling techniques. Despite the thicker armor of SMS Seydlitz and Derfflinger, 
both ships had gun turrets penetrated by British gunfire. German gun crews generally adhered to 
stricter munitions handling techniques―a result of the lessons learned at the Battle of Dogger 
Bank in 1915.
36
 Coupled with less volatile chemical composition of the German charges and the 
use of brass cartridges that were resistant to flash fires, the superior precautions aboard the 
German vessels prevented them from being destroyed by catastrophic explosions. Conversely, 
the British packed as many shells as possible in the gun turrets and working chambers in an 
attempt to increase their rate of fire. The nature of the British propellant compounded this 
dangerous situation; it had a tendency to become increasingly unstable as it aged. Finally, the 
British powder was stored in silk bags that easily ignited. This doomed the battlecruisers 
Indefatigable, Queen Mary, and Invincible, and nearly destroyed Beatty's flagship Lion as well. 
These factors will be discussed in detail in chapter three. 
 Although the Battle of Jutland was not a tactically decisive engagement, it had 
tremendous strategic significance. Indeed, it was strategically significant precisely because it was 
tactically inconclusive. The indecisive outcome of the battle convinced Admiral Scheer that the 
German fleet could not win the war; three days after the battle, he informed Kaiser Wilhelm II 
that "even the most successful outcome of a fleet action [would] not force England to make 
peace."
37
 He therefore pressed the Kaiser to allow unrestricted submarine warfare to resume, 
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which the Kaiser authorized on 1 February 1917.
38
 This ultimately led to the United States' 
entrance into the conflict, which hastened the Allied victory in 1918.  
 To properly understand the outcome of the Battle of Jutland, it is important to examine 
the technical characteristics of the warships―especially their design strengths and faults―and 
how they interacted with the decisions made by the commanders. These characteristics are best 
exemplified by the British and German battlecruiser squadrons, and will be examined in detail in 
this paper. As important as the impact of the differences in ammunition and gun crew drill just 
noted were, they took effect within the larger context of the technical characteristics of the two 
sides’ ships, particularly those of the battle ships and battlecruisers and it is to those technical 
characteristics that we now turn.  
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Chapter I: Technical Characteristics 
The technical characteristics of the ships that fought at Jutland, especially the armament and 
armor, are critical to gaining a thorough understanding of the outcome of the engagement. The 
capabilities and weaknesses of both the British and German battlecruisers, most importantly the 
power and range of their guns and the quality of their armor protection, directly impacted how 
the ships were employed during the battle. These characteristics also helped to decide the 
performance of these ships both against their corresponding adversaries and against other types 
of warships at the Battle of Jutland. 
 The battlecruisers that took part in the Battle of Jutland were equipped with a variety of 
armaments, including large-caliber main guns, small-diameter defensive guns, and submerged 
torpedo tubes built into the hulls of both British and German ships. The most important of these 
weapons were the large-caliber guns. The secondary guns were primarily used to keep light 
cruisers and destroyers at bay, while the torpedo tubes proved largely useless—not a single 
capital ship was able to maneuver into an effective firing position during the entire battle.  
10 
 
The German warships were armed with the following guns:
 39
 
Ship Gun caliber Number of guns 
Von der Tann 11 inch SK L/45
40
 8 
Moltke / Seydlitz 11 inch SK L/50 10 
Derfflinger / Lützow 12 inch SK L/50 8 
Total number of heavy guns: 44 
 
The British battlecruisers were armed as follows:
 41
 
Ship Gun caliber Number of guns 
Invincible class /  
Indefatigable class 
BL 12-inch Mark X
42
 8 
Lion class / Tiger BL 13.5-inch Mark V 8 
Total (excluding Invincible class): 48 
Total (including Invincible class, excluding Indefatigable and 
Queen Mary):
 43
 
56 
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 The British advantage in heavy guns was mitigated to a degree by much heavier armor on 
the German ships. The strongest armored belt on the British ships was that of Tiger, which was 9 
inches thick. All three Lion-class, two Indefatigable-class, and three Invincible-class ships were 
equipped with armor belts that were only 6 inches thick.
44
 In comparison, the least protected 
German battlecruiser, Von der Tann, had an armored belt that was 9.8 inches thick. Moltke's belt 
was 10.6 inches thick, while both Seydlitz and the two Derfflinger-class ships had 12-inch-thick 
side armor.
45
 The difference in armoring was due in large part to the fact that the German ships 
were designed to be able to fight in the line of battle against an enemy fleet while their British 
counterparts were not.
 46
 Admiral Jacky Fisher, the creator of the British battlecruisers, 
envisioned his ships serving in rapid-response squadrons designed to hunt down enemy warships 
instead of fighting in a battle line.
47
 This was a result of the numerical inferiority of the German 
battleships. Once contact with an opponent was made, the German battlecruisers were intended 
to join the line of battleships and fight the fleet action, where the two opposing lines would trade 
shots.
48
 The advantage was further reduced by the poor quality of British armor-piercing shells, 
which caused many of them to break up or explode on impact.
49
 
 The 11-inch guns of Von der Tann were mounted in four gun turrets; one turret was 
positioned forward of the main superstructure on the centerline, two were placed in a staggered 
arrangement amidships—the first of the central pair was on the port side and the second was 
located aft of the first and on the starboard side—and the fourth was aft of the rear conning 
tower. The central turrets had the ability to shoot over the deck, which meant that all eight guns 
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could fire on the broadside. Von der Tann's turrets allowed gun elevation to 20°, which provided 
a maximum range of 22,300 yards. Rate of fire for these weapons was up to three rounds per 
minute. The armor-piercing shells fired by these guns weighed 670 pounds; a full broadside had 
a total weight of 5,360 pounds. 
50
 
 Von der Tann was heavily armored; the 9.8-inch-thick main armored belt extended from 
just ahead of the forward main battery gun turret to past the rear gun turret, which covered 
approximately 350 feet of the hull, or nearly two-thirds of the length of the ship. Transverse 
bulkheads, 7 inches thick, capped the central section of the ship which was protected by the main 
belt. The remainder of the ship was protected by a thinner belt; the bow and stern sections of 
armor were reduced to seven inches immediately past the main belt, and tapered down to four 
inches at either end of the ship.
 51
 The main battery gun turrets, as well as the barbettes and 
ammunition rooms upon which they sat, were armored with 9-inch-thick sides. The gun turret 
roofs were only 3.5 inches thick.
52
 
 Moltke and Seydlitz were armed with an improved version of the 11-inch guns on the Von 
der Tann; the primary enhancement was a lengthening of the barrel: 50 calibers in length, 
compared to 45 calibers in the earlier guns.
53
 This gave the shell a higher muzzle velocity; 2,887 
feet per second versus 2,805 feet per second for the shorter weapons. They fired the same 670-
pound armor-piercing shell as in the 45-caliber guns. Moltke carried her guns in turrets that 
allowed elevation only to 13.5°; the range of these guns was 19,500, significantly lower than Von 
der Tann. Seydlitz's gun turrets had been modified to increase elevation to 16°, which gave the 
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guns a longer range of 21,000 yards.
54
 Moltke and Seydlitz carried ten guns in five turrets; the 
fifth turret in both ships was placed in a superfiring position above the rearmost turret.
55
 The two 
ships each had a full broadside weight of 6,700 pounds. As with the shorter guns on Von der 
Tann, these guns fired at a rate of three shells per minute.
56
 
 Moltke's armored belt was strengthened, relative to that of Von der Tann, from 9.8 inches 
to 10.6 inches in thickness. It was also more comprehensive; it extended some 15 feet above the 
waterline, compared to only 10 feet on Von der Tann. However, the belt stopped directly at the 
forward and rearmost gun turrets, which provided a length of approximately 370 feet of the 612-
feet long hull. The bow section of belt was somewhat thinner, tapering from 6 inches to 4; the 
stern section was only 4 inches thick. The transverse bulkheads on either end of the central 
citadel was 8 inches thick.
 57
 The armor system protecting the gun turrets mounted on Moltke was 
the same as that of the turrets aboard Von der Tann.
58
 
 The armor system that protected Seydlitz was improved still more from that of Moltke. 
The main armored belt was increased in thickness from 11 to 11.75 inches; it was also 
approximately 20 feet longer than on Moltke. The bow and stern sections were less protected 
compared to the preceding design; armor thickness tapered from 4.75 to 4 inches at either end of 
the ship. The transverse bulkheads that connected the starboard and port sides of the armored belt 
were increased to 8.75 inches.
59
 The gun turrets were modified from those mounted on Moltke; 
the thickness of the roofs was decreased to 2.75 inches while the sides were increased to 9.8 
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inches.
60
 As in the earlier vessels, the barbettes were 9 inches thick on the exposed sides and 
thinner on the ship's interior.
61
 
 The two Derfflinger class battlecruisers were equipped with eight 12-inch guns in four 
turrets each. The arrangement of these guns was also greatly superior to that of the earlier ships; 
all four turrets were mounted on the centerline in two superfiring pairs. This gave the ships a less 
restricted field of fire on the broadside. These guns were significantly more powerful than the 
smaller guns mounted on the earlier battlecruisers. They fired 894-pound armor-piercing shells at 
a muzzle velocity of 2,805 feet per second, up to three shots per minute.
62
 Elevation in the turrets 
on these two ships was limited to 13.5°; the range at maximum elevation was 20,500 yards.
63
 
Although the number of guns on each ship had decreased from ten to eight, the broadside weight 
had been increased to 7,152 pounds.  
 The Derfflinger-class ships were protected by an even more comprehensive armor 
arrangement than their predecessors. The belt was thickened to 12 inches and ran from the 
forward barbette to approximately 10 feet past the rearmost gun turret, a length of roughly 400 
feet. The transverse bulkheads that capped the armored belt on either end were thickened 
somewhat to an even 9 inches.
64
 The turrets were armored similarly to those aboard Seydlitz, 
though their roofs were increased to 4.3 inches in thickness.
65
 Protection for the barbettes was 
strengthened to 10.25 inches on the exposed areas.
66
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 In total, all five of the German battlecruisers had a combined broadside weight of 33,064 
pounds per salvo. At the maximum rate of fire, this amounted to a broadside weight of 99,192 
pounds of armor-piercing ordnance per minute—but only on paper. During the battle, the typical 
sustained rate of fire—for both the German battlecruisers and battleships—was closer to one shot 
per gun per minute.
67
 
 Turning to the British battlecruisers, the six Invincible and Indefatigable class ships each 
carried eight BL 12-inch Mark X guns, mounted in four twin turrets in an arrangement similar to 
that of Von der Tann; two staggered wing turrets amidships and two on the centerline, forward 
and aft of the superstructure. The amidships turrets of the Invincible class were too closely 
positioned; they were incapable of firing across the deck. As a result, their broadsides were 
limited to six of their eight guns.
68
 The Indefatigable class was built longer, in part to rectify this 
problem; all eight guns on these vessels could fire on the broadside.
69
 The guns fired 850-pound 
projectiles at a muzzle velocity of 2,725 feet per second. The guns could be elevated to 13.5°, 
which enabled a maximum range of 18,850 yards. For the Invincible class, the full broadside 
weight was 5,100 pounds per ship; for the Indefatigable class, it was 6,800 pounds.
70
 The rate of 
fire for these guns, as in most other British capital ships, was approximately two shots per 
minute.
71
 
 The Invincible class ships were protected by a thin waterline belt that was six inches thick 
amidships; it ran from the rear "X" turret to just forward of the "A" turret, about 58 percent of the 
567-foot hull. Past "A" turret, the belt decreased in thickness to 4 inches and ran up to the bow. 
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The belt itself was not particularly comprehensive; it had a height of approximately 12 feet, most 
of which was above the waterline. The main battery gun turrets and their supporting barbettes 
were protected with 7-inch thick steel plating.
72
 
 For Indefatigable, the belt was significantly modified: the central portion remained 6-
inches thick, though it was shortened, and covered only a 298-foot section amidships, or slightly 
more than 50 percent of the hull. The belt sections shielding the "A" and "X" barbettes were 
reduced in thickness to 4 inches and capped on the ends by 4 and 4.5 inch thick transverse 
bulkheads in the bow and stern, respectively. Past the transverse bulkheads, the belt again 
decreased to 2.5 inches in thickness. The turrets and barbettes were armored as in the previous 
class.
73
 New Zealand was built later and with a somewhat revised armor scheme. The belt 
segments that covered the "A" and "X" turrets were increased in thickness to 5 inches. Instead of 
extending the 2.5-inch thick sections to the bow and stern, they were shortened, but increased in 
thickness to 4 inches. The central portion of the belt and the main battery armor remained the 
same as on Indefatigable.
74
 
 The three Lion class ships carried their eight BL 13.5-inch Mark V guns in four twin 
turrets, all on the centerline. Two turrets were closely positioned in a superfiring arrangement 
forward of the superstructure. A third was located amidships between the second and third 
funnels, and the fourth turret to the aft of the rear conning tower. The amidships "Q" turret was 
partially restricted in its field of fire; the third funnel prevented it from firing directly astern. On 
the Tiger, this was corrected by moving the "Q" turret farther aft.
75
  
                                                          
72
 John Roberts, Battlecruisers (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997), 99 
73
 Roberts, op. cit., 101 
74
 Roberts, op. cit., 102 
75
 Burr, op. cit., 13–14 
17 
 
 The guns on Lion and Princess Royal fired 1,250-pound shells at a muzzle velocity of 
2,582 feet per second. Queen Mary and Tiger were equipped with more robustly constructed gun 
mountings; these permitted the use of heavier 1,400-pound projectiles. Muzzle velocity was 
slightly lower, at 2,491 feet per second. All four ships could elevate their main guns to 20°. The 
guns aboard Lion and Princess Royal could engage targets out to 23,820 yards; the lower muzzle 
velocity of the guns mounted on Queen Mary and Tiger resulted in a correspondingly shorter 
range of 23,740 yards, though the difference was negligible. Lion and Princess Royal had a 
broadside weight of 10,000 pounds, while the heavier shells that Tiger and Queen Mary fired 
gave a broadside of 11,200.
76
 
 In response to their better-armored German rivals, the armor plan for the three Lion class 
ships was dramatically strengthened, though it was still not as strong as that of their German 
counterparts. The central belt section was increased to 9 inches, though it covered an even 
smaller percentage of the hull than it did on Indefatigable: approximately 44 percent of the 700-
foot long ship. This segment of the belt remained as tall as in the preceding ships, though it was 
augmented by 6-inch thick plating that extended to the main deck. Abreast of "B" turret, the belt 
was decreased to 6 inches, and again to 5 inches at "A" turret, and finally to 4 inches towards the 
bow. The belt was capped at that point by a 4-inch thick bulkhead. Aft of the main belt, the side 
protection was decreased to 5 inches and then to 4 past "X" turret. It was capped by a 2.5-inch 
thick bulkhead. The main battery turrets were armored with 9-inch thick plates, as were the 
above-deck portions of the barbettes. Below deck, the armor thickness was decreased slightly to 
8 inches.
77
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 Of the British ships, Tiger had the most comprehensive armor system. The main belt was 
still 9 inches thick and covered a similar portion of the hull as in the Lion class, but it was 
augmented on the bottom edge by 3 inches of armor plate that extended armor protection further 
below the waterline. The ship's 6-inch thick upper side armor was also extended to the forecastle 
deck, though past the conning tower it was reduced to 5 inches. As with the Lion class ships, the 
belt was reduced to 5 inches at the forward and rear battery turrets and capped with 4-inch thick 
bulkheads. The main-gun turrets and barbettes retained the armor thickness of the former ships.
78
  
 Counting only the ships present during the initial battlecruiser engagement, the British 
battlecruiser force had a combined broadside weight of 56,000 pounds. All of the guns were 
capable of a rate of fire of two rounds per gun per minute. This was 112,000 pounds every 60 
seconds for the six ships under Beatty's command. Again, this rate of fire was not met during the 
battle; as with their German opponents, the sustained rate of fire was approximately one shot per 
minute.
79
 When the three Invincible class ships arrived later in the battle, they added a total 
broadside of 15,300 pounds. 
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Chapter II: Analysis of Performance 
 At the initial contact on the afternoon of 31 May, the German battlecruiser squadron, 
positioned to the southeast of the British reconnaissance force, was steaming northward. Beatty 
had also turned his ships north in order to rendezvous with the Grand Fleet; about 45 miles 
separated the two forces.
80
 Once the opposing cruiser and destroyer screens made contact, the 
battlecruisers of both fleets turned to convergent courses, with Hipper's ships steaming in west-
northwesterly and Beatty's squadron sailing northeasterly.
81
 At 1522 UTC, observers aboard 
Seydlitz saw the tripod masts of the two nearest battlecruisers, which turned out to be 
Indefatigable and New Zealand of the 2nd Battlecruiser Squadron. The British had identified the 
Germans by 1530.
82
  
 Environmental factors favored the Germans in this portion of the battle; the westerly 
winds blew smoke from Beatty's battlecruisers towards the German ships, which obscured the 
view of the British gun layers. The British 9th Destroyer Flotilla, which was proceeding at full 
speed on Beatty's starboard side, also left a considerable cloud of smoke in its wake, which 
further hampered the British gunners' ability to spot their German rivals.
83
 The German ships 
were also painted a lighter color, which made them harder to distinguish from the sea at long 
ranges.
84
 
 At this point, the Germans were well within the range of the 13.5-inch guns aboard 
Beatty's four leading ships.
85
 Instead of ordering his longer-ranged ships to open fire, Beatty 
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decided to wait until he had closed to within 18,500 yards, which was the maximum range of the 
12-inch gunned Indefatigable and New Zealand. Beatty did so to ensure that all six of his ships 
would be able to engage the German force simultaneously. However, the rangefinders aboard 
Lion, Beatty's flagship, miscalculated the range and estimated it to be some 2,000 yards greater 
than it was. As a result, the German ships had been able to close to approximately 16,000 yards; 
they opened fire first at 1548.
86
 The British battlecruisers were still in the process of deploying 
into combat formation, as Beatty was still under the impression that the German ships were only 
beginning to reach effective range.
87
 At the time gunfire began, Tiger and Lion were still in the 
process of turning to the southeast, and were able to fire only their forward guns.
88
  
 It is unclear why Beatty decided to wait until all six of his ships could engage their 
targets. It is reasonable to suppose, however, that Beatty's loss of control over his ships at the 
Battle of Dogger Bank a year and a half earlier may have influenced this decision. At the battle, 
Beatty had ordered his ships to fire as they reached effective range; his leading ship, Lion, 
opened fire at a distance of some 20,000 yards at 0952. It took nearly 45 minutes for all of 
Beatty's ships to move into firing positions.
89
 Between 1100 and 1120, Lion was hit three times. 
One shell penetrated the ship's side armor and allowed water to flood the feed tank for the port 
engines; this damage forced the engine-room crew to shut off the machinery, which significantly 
reduced Lion's speed. Signal transmission errors caused Beatty's other ships to concentrate on the 
fatally damaged armored cruiser Blücher instead of pursuing Hipper's three battlecruisers.
90
 
Beatty may have viewed his decision to open fire haphazardly at extreme range as the root cause 
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for his loss of control over his squadron. When the opportunity to engage his German counterpart 
again presented itself, he surely was determined to avoid making the same mistake again. 
 Beatty's perception was reinforced by a long-standing pre-war consensus amongst British 
admirals that fighting would be done at medium range, that is, from approximately 9,000 to 
10,000 yards. Only in 1912 had senior officers begun to push for longer-range gunnery 
practice.
91
 Even then, many within the Admiralty assumed that the German fleet would quickly 
charge the British fleet at high speed before turning to a parallel course, at which point the battle 
would continue at medium range.
92
 Indeed, Admiral Jellicoe issued the following directive for 
the entire fleet on 31 August 1914, some four weeks after the outbreak of war: 
 "on a clear day and unless the enemy opens fire earlier 13.5-inch gun ships will open 
 deliberate fire at 15,000 yards, 12-inch gun ships at 13,000 yards. . . . At extreme ranges 
 fire should be by deliberate salvos until the enemy is hit or straddled; the rate of fire 
 should then be increased, but ships should not employ rapid fire at ranges over 10,000 
 yards without occasional checks to a slower rate until they are certain they are hitting."
93
 
The tactical doctrine of the Royal Navy stipulated that capital ships were to move to closer 
ranges before opening fire. Beatty had experimented with firing at extreme range at Dogger 
Bank, without positive results. The negative experience at Dogger Bank reconfirmed for Beatty 
the value of holding fire until his ships were absolutely ready, or in this case, until his opponent 
had begun firing first.  
                                                          
91
 Nicholas A. Lambert,  "'Our Bloody Ships' or 'Our Bloody System'? Jutland and the Loss of the Battle Cruisers, 
1916." The Journal of Military History, (January 1998):  33 
92
 Jon Tetsuro Sumida, "A Matter of Timing: The Royal Navy and the Tactics of Decisive Battle." 1912–1916 The 
Journal of Military History (January 2003): 100 
93
 Sumida, op. cit., 111 
22 
 
 The initial German salvos were long for the most part, but within 1,000 yards of their 
targets, with the exception of those from Von der Tann and Moltke, which were about 1,700 
yards long and 500 yards short, respectively. Conversely, Tiger, Lion, and New Zealand overshot 
their opponents by well over 2,000 yards; Princess Royal was the only vessel on either side to 
have made a somewhat accurate range estimate in the opening shots. As Queen Mary and 
Indefatigable were sunk with tremendous loss of life, there are no exact figures for their ranges; 
a survivor from Queen Mary reported the estimated range was 17,500 yards.
94
 
 In the span of three minutes, Lützow fired five four-gun salvos and struck its target, Lion, 
with the fifth. Moltke reported similar success; in the first three minutes the ship scored two hits 
on Tiger, and continued to do so for several minutes. After firing for 10 minutes, Derfflinger hit 
Princess Royal for the first time.
95
 Seydlitz and Von der Tann also claimed hits on Queen Mary 
and Indefatigable, respectively. It was 1555, 7 minutes after the first shots were fired, by the time 
Queen Mary scored the first British hit, on Seydlitz; a second hit followed two minutes later. The 
second hit penetrated Seydlitz's superfiring turret barbette and burned out the gun turret. Lützow 
was hit twice in the forecastle by a salvo from Lion at 1600, though to no noticeable effect at this 
early stage of the battle. In the first 12 minutes of the battle, and counting only those made on 
Lion, Tiger, and Princess Royal, the Germans tallied 15 hits, in comparison with four by the 
British.
96
 
97
 
 The advantage in range the four leading British ships possessed had been lost, largely 
because of Beatty's decision to hold his fire until all six of his battlecruisers could bring their 
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guns to bear. This problematic decision was compounded by inaccurate rangefinding aboard the 
flagship, which caused Beatty to believe he was farther from the Germans than he actually was. 
Had Beatty been correctly advised as to the distance to the German ships, it is almost certain he 
would have ordered his ships to open fire several minutes earlier than he did. While the early 
shooting of both sides was poor, the additional time this would have granted the British ships 
would have allowed them to correct their firing solutions under more favorable conditions. Most 
importantly, they would have been able to fire several salvos without having to maneuver 
erratically to avoid incoming German shells; the task of the gunnery officers was much easier 
when their base was moving in a smooth, predictable course. It is also safe to assume that, had 
the British gunners been provided with a more exact range estimation, their first shots would 
have been more accurate.  
 The ability to engage the Germans with relative impunity would have been a tremendous 
advantage. Had they made use of it, the British might have inflicted serious damage on their 
German opponents at the outset of the battle. Nevertheless, the 12-inch guns of the two 
Indefatigable class ships were out-ranged by at least 1,000 yards by all of the German main 
battery guns. By binding to them the longer-ranged 13.5-inch guns aboard his more modern 
ships, Beatty discarded a critical strength of his battlecruisers and all but ensured the Germans 
would have the opportunity to open fire first.  
 The result of Beatty's decision was that once the British ships responded, they were 
forced to make gunnery corrections while maneuvering under hostile fire, a task at which the 
Germans proved to be more adept. The Germans scored more than three times as many hits in 
the first 12 minutes of the engagement, and this imbalance continued for the rest of the run to the 
south. For the duration of this segment of the battle, Lion was hit 9 times, Princess Royal 6, 
24 
 
Queen Mary was hit at least 7 times before it blew up, Tiger was pummeled by 14 large-caliber 
shells, New Zealand was hit once, and Indefatigable was hit at least 5 times before a magazine 
explosion destroyed the ship. In response, Lützow was hit only 4 times, Seydlitz and Moltke were 
hit 5 times apiece, Von der Tann received a mere 3 hits, and Derfflinger emerged completely 
unscathed. This amounted to 42 hits on British battlecruisers and 17 on German ships, a ratio of 
nearly 2.5 to 1.
98
  
 In the course of the entire engagement, Lützow was hit approximately 24 times by large 
caliber shells, Derfflinger sustained 21 hits, Seydlitz was hit 22 times by main guns and once by a 
torpedo, and Moltke and Von der Tann were hit five and four times by heavy guns, 
respectively.
99
 On the British side, Lion was hit by 13 large-caliber shells, Tiger was hit 15 times 
by heavy guns and four times by medium weapons, Princess Royal sustained 9 major hits, Queen 
Mary was hit seven times, Indefatigable and Invincible were both estimated to have taken five 
large-caliber hits apiece, and New Zealand was hit once.
100
  
 Lützow was the only vessel on either side to be sunk by gunfire alone, though the type of 
damage it sustained made it a unique case. At the head of the German battlecruiser line, and 
frequently targeted by multiple opponents simultaneously, Lützow was subjected to a terrific 
battering. There were five hits below the waterline in the forward section of the hull; none of the 
other ships on either side were severely damaged below the waterline. It was these underwater 
hits that doomed the vessel, though several other hits above the waterline and on the forecastle 
contributed to the fatal flooding.
101
 The lack of a torpedo bulkhead in the bow and insufficient 
internal subdivision permitted flooding to occur unchecked. When the German navy began 
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rearming in the 1930s, it examined the loss of Lützow and determined this to be the cause of the 
vessel's loss. German naval designers applied this lesson to the construction of both the 
Scharnhorst and Bismarck class battleships.
102
  
 The loss of Lützow notwithstanding, their heavier armor allowed the German 
battlecruisers to endure much more damage than their British contemporaries. A significant 
portion of the major damage done to the surviving German ships happened during the charge 
against the British line shortly after 1900. During this period, Derfflinger had taken over the lead 
position and thus became the primary target; the ship was hit 14 times the span of approximately 
six minutes.
103
 It is unlikely that the more lightly armored British battlecruisers would have been 
able to withstand such a tremendous hammering, even disregarding the tendency of their 
magazines to explode catastrophically.
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Chapter III: Propellant Charges 
 The most important issue that determined the outcome of the battlecruiser actions during 
the Battle of Jutland was the composition of the propellant charges for the main battery 
ammunition, and the manner in which it was handled. For the British heavy guns, four separate 
propellant charges were used for each shell fired. For the German guns, this consisted of a 
primary charge contained in a large brass cartridge and a smaller fore charge stored in a silk 
bag.
104
 The composition of the propellant charges of both navies was directly related to the type 
of breech blocks fitted to the main battery guns, which were themselves a result of the 
international arms industry that began to flourish in the last quarter of the 19th century. 
 Prior to the 1880s, the Woolwich arsenal, a government arms manufacturer, supplied the 
Royal Navy's guns.
105
 In the 1840s through mid-1860s, the Royal Navy experimented with large-
caliber breech-loading guns, including the Armstrong and Lancaster guns.
106
 One of the primary 
problems that had to be surmounted was how to obturate the breech chamber quickly and 
effectively. A swinging screw breech block could completely seal the breech, but it required a 
great deal of time to insert completely. In 1853, two Americans devised the interrupted screw 
system, which cut away two quarters of the screw threading. This allowed the breech block to be 
fully inserted; a quick quarter turn would then lock it in place. The one remaining problem was 
that the sections of removed threading created vents through which the propellant gas could 
escape, which rendered the system impractical.
107
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 The Navy arrived at a short term solution to the problem by retaining muzzle-loading 
guns made of wrought iron, which were declared to be the standard armament for all major 
warships by 1864.
108
 The ascendency of steel breech-loading guns constructed by the German 
firm Krupp between the 1870s and 1880s, however, convinced the Royal Navy to switch to 
breech-loaders as well, which brought the obturation problem back to the surface .
109
 The 
independent British firm Armstrong eventually settled on the de Bange system for sealing the 
breech. The de Bange system, which had been invented by a French Army captain in 1872, used 
an easily deformable cap in front of the breech block that would seal the breech under pressure 
from the detonation of the propellant charges.
110
 The prohibitive expense of retooling the 
Woolwich arsenal in order to produce the new steel guns eventually led the Royal Navy to begin 
awarding contracts to Armstrong, which could provide the equipment at a lower cost.
111
 
 Meanwhile, in Germany, the Krupp firm experimented with a number of breech blocks 
starting in the 1850s. Instead of a swinging breech block, a sliding block was adopted in 1859. 
This fit into a mortise slot cut into the rear of the gun; the block was locked in place by a screw-
threaded rod which passed through both the block and the barrel.
112
 Krupp tested several 
variations on this system before deciding to use a brass cartridge case to seal the breech. By the 
1880s, this system was standardized on all calibers of artillery produced by the firm.
113
 
 The xenophobic nature of the naval arms race that began between Britain and Germany in 
the late 1890s ensured that Armstrong would not sell its weapons to Germany; likewise Krupp 
would not do business with Great Britain. Moreover, the growing dominance of the French firm 
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Schneider-Cruesot in the international arms market forced Krupp to focus its efforts on the 
German naval construction program, which would grant the company an assured source of 
contracts.
114
 To help ensure that naval expansion met with increased support in the Reichstag, the 
German parliament, Krupp lent considerable financial support to create the German Navy 
League in 1898.
115
 As the navy became more and more expensive, resistance grew within the 
Reichstag. Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, the architect of the German battle fleet, needed every 
shred of political support he could muster;
116
 therefore he could not consider awarding contracts 
for naval armaments to any firm other than Krupp.  
 Since the de Bange breech completely sealed the breech by itself, the propellant could be 
packaged in simple silk bags. The British cordite charges were stored two apiece in metal 
containers in the magazines. The igniters on top of the charges were protected by a thick paper 
cover that was removed prior to loading. Warrant Officer Grant, who was the Chief Gunner 
aboard HMS Lion after 1915, recounted in his unpublished memoirs that he found the gun crews 
to have repeatedly violated established safety regulations. The crews frequently removed the 
paper padding in the magazines, as opposed to waiting until loading; this allowed grains of 
propellant to leak out, which left a trail all the way from the gun turrets to the magazines. The 
charges were stacked by the dozens in the walkways of the magazine and in the handling rooms, 
where doors were left wide open during battle. All of these practices were developed in order to 
increase the rate of fire of the main guns, a priority Admiral Beatty emphasized after the Battle 
of Dogger Bank.
117
 Grant noted that the turret commanders were well aware of these practices 
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and generally condoned them.
118
Grant reintroduced safety precautions to his gun crews, though 
his changes were not mirrored by the other ships in the squadron. Among the most important 
steps taken was the order to keep the magazine doors closed except when ammunition was 
passed through.
119
 
 The Royal Navy was dominated by a mindset that emphasized rapidity of fire. Vice 
Admiral Stanley Colville, commander of the 1st Battle Squadron, argued that, "rapid and 
sustained fire...is essential. The danger of the charges being ignited...may be disregarded."
120
 
Vice Admiral George Warrender, the 2nd Battle Squadron commander, concurred: "It is 
considered more important to have the ammunition provided and ready for immediate use and to 
risk the chance of a cordite fire, rather than to guard against a fire, and to have the ship 
unprepared for an attack."
121
 Admiral Jellicoe's chief of staff, Rear Admiral Charles Madden, 
stated, "the risk of the explosion of stacked ammunition is secondary to maintaining a rapid 
fire."
122
 At the Battle of the Falkland Islands in December 1914, the British armored cruiser 
HMS Kent was nearly destroyed by an ammunition fire. As a result, the Admiralty issued an 
order that forbade the stockpiling of ammunition outside of the magazines, although the directive 
was largely ignored in the fleet.
123
 Commander Hubert Dannreuther, a gunnery officer from 
Invincible who had survived the destruction of the ship at Jutland, later confirmed to the Third 
Sea Lord that the gun crews aboard the ship continued to practice ammunition stockpiling.
124
  
 The Germans stored their main propellant charges in large brass cartridges equipped with  
protective metal covers. Smaller fore charges were kept in silk bags and stored in metal cases. 
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These characteristics rendered the German charges less prone to ammunition fires. As in the 
British ships, before the Battle of Dogger Bank, German gun crews were prone to breach safety 
regulations and remove the covers from the main charges.
125
 A door that connected the 
ammunition handling rooms for the superfiring rear turrets was normally kept closed, but at 
Dogger Bank it was left open.
126
 
 The Germans, however, had taken a hard lesson from Dogger Bank, where the 
battlecruiser SMS Seydlitz was severely damaged by a flash fire in the rear ammunition 
magazine. During this battle, a large-caliber shell struck the rearmost barbette and dislodged a 
section of armor plate that started a fire inside the turret. More than six and a half tons of 
propellant burned in a matter of seconds; only the quick order to flood the rear magazines saved 
the ship. A subsequent investigation discovered that only the brass cartridges that had their lids 
still on did not burn.
127
 The investigators issued a report that called for a number of new safety 
precautions. Among these was a mandate that the fore charges could not be removed from their 
metal containers and the main charges were to be safeguarded until they were both to be loaded. 
Also, propellant was not to be piled up in the turrets and the ammunition hoists were to be 
equipped with automatically-closing doors.
128
 Of these recommendations, the primary steps 
adopted were to reduce the number of propellant charges in the turrets and limit the number of 
charges that could be removed from their containers. Anti-flash doors, however, were not 
installed in any of the ships, except Lützow, at the time of the battle.
129
 
 Another important difference between the propellant charges was their chemical 
compositions. Both charges relied primarily on nitrocellulose for their explosive power; 
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problematically, nitrocellulose degraded over time and in the process became increasingly 
unstable. 
130
 In 1903, decomposed nitrocellulose in propellant charges aboard the German cruiser 
Vineta exploded. The navy subsequently held an inquiry that discovered the cause of the 
accident.
131
 The navy therefore developed a new propellant formula that added a stabilizer to the 
nitrocellulose that significantly reduced the tendency toward decomposition, something the 
British failed to do.
132
  
 British propellant was shaped into cylindrical cords, while German propellant consisted 
of tubular grains. The grains provided a smaller initial surface area per pound of explosive than 
did the cords, which caused them to burn slower.
133
 Of all of the differences between British and 
German charges, this proved to be the most fatal. Combined with the relaxed handling of the 
charges and their fragile silk containers, the much faster burn rate caused the exposed charges to 
explode rather than simply burn. The German brass cartridges were less prone to catch fire, and 
when they did, they did not explode.
134
  
 The differences between German and British propellant charges constituted the crucial 
factor that determined the outcome of the engagement. Indeed, both Derfflinger and Seydlitz 
suffered serious turret and barbette hits in the course of the battle, though neither ship exploded 
from an ammunition fire as the British ships had. In reference to a serious hit sustained during 
the charge against the British battle line after 1900,  Georg von Hase, the gunnery officer aboard 
Derfflinger, later remarked:  
 "At [1913]...a 15-inch shell pierced the armor of 'Caesar' turret and exploded inside...the 
 shell set on fire two charges in the turret, The flames from the burning charges spread to 
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 the transfer chamber, there [they] set fire to four more charges, and from there to the 
 magazine, where four more were ignited. The burning cartridge cases emitted great 
 tongues of flame which shot up out of the turrets...but they only blazed, they did not 
 explode as had been the case in the enemy battlecruisers. This saved the ship..."
135
 
British naval historian John Campbell concurred, arguing that "If British propellant charges had 
been used in the German ships, the Derfflinger would certainly have blown up as would in all 
probability the Seydlitz, and possibly the Von der Tann."
136
 
 Although the British charges were much more prone to catastrophic fires, proper 
handling could have mitigated this danger to a degree. John Campbell stated that the hit Lützow 
scored on Lion's "Q" turret at 1600 would have destroyed the ship had her magazine doors not 
been shut.
137
 The safety precautions put in place by Warrant Officer Grant after he arrived in 
1915 in all likelihood saved the ship. Had the crews of the rest of the battlecruisers followed 
similar procedures, their ships might not have been destroyed. 
 The British Navy, however, failed to adequately absorb the lessons from the destruction 
of the three battlecruisers sunk at Jutland. Initial investigations, both by Beatty and by the 
Admiralty, discovered that improper cordite handling was to blame for the severe losses on 31 
May.
138
 As time passed, however, both Beatty and Admiral John Jellicoe, the Grand Fleet 
commander, altered their positions. Instead of crew negligence, they blamed the loss of Queen 
Mary, Indefatigable, and Invincible on insufficient armor protection and poor anti-flash systems 
in the gun turrets.
139
 On 14 July 1916, Beatty sent a letter to Jellicoe insisting that, "either our 
methods of ship construction are seriously at fault or that the nature of the ammunition we use is 
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not sufficiently stable to ensure safety."
140
 The Admiralty protested these remarks and continued 
to insist that improper handling techniques were to blame. Jellicoe, however, was promoted to 
1st Sea Lord on 28 November 1916. In this position, he was able to effectively suppress the 
findings of the Admiralty investigation and replace it with the explanation he and Beatty 
favored.
141
 He deleted the memorandum that the Director of Naval Construction had written on 
the loss of the three battlecruisers, stating, "the memorandum should certainly not be issued—it 
does not at all represent the views of officers at sea and I do not agree with it."
142
 Despite the 
insistence that unsafe propellant was not to blame for the disaster, in April 1917, the Royal Navy 
formulated a new version of cordite, which included a chalk-based stabilizer.
143
 As tests would 
show in 1945, however, it was still not up to the standards of safety reached by the propellants of 
other navies.  
 The Battle of Jutland was not the last engagement that saw a British battlecruiser explode 
catastrophically at the hands of a German capital ship. On 24 May 1941, during World War II, 
the German battleship Bismarck and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen engaged the British 
battleship Prince of Wales and the battlecruiser Hood. In the span of approximately five minutes, 
Bismarck's 15-inch guns fired five salvos, the fifth of which struck Hood and penetrated the 
ship's belt armor into one of the aft magazines where it detonated; Hood exploded and quickly 
sank.
144
 
 That is, at least, the official version of events according to the Royal Navy inquiries held 
in the aftermath of the sinking. A number of other theories have been proposed for the sinking, 
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including that the fire started on the boat deck by an 8-inch shell from Prinz Eugen spread to a 
magazine and ignited the propellant charges, or that one of Bismarck's shells fell short but turned 
upwards and penetrated the ship's side below the armor belt.
145
 After thoroughly examining the 
evidence, naval historian William Jurens concluded that the official explanation was the most 
probable.
146
 He argued that the nature of the British propellant was to blame, pointing to tests 
conducted by the United States Navy Bureau of Ordnance in 1945. These tests examined the 
conditions under which propellant charges would ignite. A nozzle was designed to replicate the 
flash produced by the simultaneous detonation of several propellant charges. The Bureau of 
Ordnance discovered that the British double base cordite would catch fire when placed 530 
millimeters from the nozzle, while the standard American single base charges would not burn 
unless they were within 120 millimeters. A new American "SPCG" flashless propellant had to be 
placed closer than 25 millimeters for it to ignite.
147
 In practical terms, an explosion in a British 
magazine would detonate nearly 75 times as much propellant as the same explosion in an 
American magazine. Jurens concludes from this evidence that, "had Hood carried single base 
propellant instead of cordite, there is in fact a good possibility that the fatal explosion might 
never had occurred."
148
                                                          
145
 W. J. Jurens, "The Loss of H.M.S. Hood—A Re-examination." Warship International XXIV, No. 2 (1987): 151-
154. 
146
 Jurens, op. cit., 155 
147
 Jurens, op. cit., 151 
148
 Jurens, op. cit., 152 
35 
 
 
Conclusion 
 Admiral David Beatty has been both criticized and praised for his handling of the British 
battlecruiser squadrons at the Battle of Jutland. The battlecruiser force under Beatty's command 
was severely mauled during the engagement; three of his nine vessels were destroyed by German 
gunfire, and a fourth—his flagship Lion—nearly exploded as well. Ultimately, to a large extent 
Beatty can be blamed for the disaster. While the proximate cause of the explosions aboard the 
British ships was the highly unstable and poorly protected propellant charges—something 
entirely out of Beatty's control—he failed to ensure safety precautions in the magazine rooms 
were being followed. Furthermore, his own directives concerning the rate of fire of the main 
battery were the cause for the discontinuation of many of these safety procedures. The failure to 
enforce proper handling procedures virtually guaranteed catastrophic magazine explosions would 
occur. This was clearly demonstrated by the incident aboard his flagship Lion; the fact that the 
magazine doors had been closed—a practice implemented only on this ship—when the turret 
was penetrated allowed the crew enough time to flood the magazine, which prevented the ship 
from being destroyed.  
 Despite the seemingly overwhelming superiority of the British Battlecruiser Squadrons, 
in terms of numbers of warships and the number, caliber, and weight of shell of their guns, their 
German opponents emerged from the battle having inflicted much more destruction than they 
had absorbed. The German battlecruisers did enjoy several advantages over their British rivals; 
their heavier armor allowed them to stand up to more punishing fire. Their more highly-trained 
gun crews were on average more capable of dealing damage, even without the aid of a 
mechanical fire control system comparable to the Dreyer Table or Argo Clock on the British 
36 
 
ships. A still-greater advantage was the superior performance of the German armor-piercing 
shells compared to the British versions. 
 In the end, however, the performance of the ships' armaments and ammunition, fire 
control, and armor systems was of secondary importance. The deciding factor that led to the loss 
of three British battlecruisers at the hands of their German rivals was the physical differences in 
both sides' propellant charges and how they were handled. Both German and British 
battlecruisers had their turrets and barbettes penetrated and the ammunition inside ignited, 
though only the British ships suffered catastrophic explosions as a result. This was the direct 
consequence of the greater vulnerability and much faster burn rate of the British propellant and 
the unsafe manner in which it was handled. Indefatigable, Queen Mary, and Invincible might 
very well have survived the battle if their crews had followed the prescribed safety regulations 
for the handling of cordite. 
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Appendix I: The Battle of Dogger Bank 
The Battle of Dogger Bank was fought on 24 January 1915, between the battlecruiser forces of 
Rear Admiral Franz von Hipper and Vice Admiral David Beatty. The German forces intended to 
sweep the Dogger Bank, a shallow area in the North Sea, where British light forces were known 
to operate. The German forces consisted of Hipper's flagship Seydlitz, Moltke, Derfflinger, and 
the large armored cruiser Blücher; the battlecruiser Von der Tann was unavailable due to 
periodic maintenance requirements. Hipper was supported by four light cruisers and 19 torpedo 
boats. Arrayed against him were the 1st and 2nd Battlecruiser Squadrons, which comprised the 
battlecruisers Lion, Beatty's flagship, Tiger, Queen Mary, Indomitable, and New Zealand.
149
 The 
ability to intercept and decrypt German wireless signals forewarned the British of the impending 
operation, so Admiral Beatty was able to ambush the German battlecruisers. 
 Both forces left their respective anchorages on the afternoon of 23 January and proceeded 
to the Dogger Bank, which they reached the following morning.
150
 Shortly after 0700, the 
opposing forces encountered each other. Upon observing Beatty's battlecruisers approaching, 
Hipper decided to turn for port, in the assumption that the Grand Fleet was in the area as well.
151
 
The German ships were limited to a speed of 23 knots due to poor-quality coal and mechanical 
difficulties;
152
 the British ships, meanwhile, were capable of 27 knots. In less than two hours, the 
British had closed the distance and began to enter effective gunnery range. Lion, the leading 
British ship, opened fire on Blücher, the rearmost German vessel. As more British ships came 
into range, they concentrated their fire on Blücher, scoring several major hits in the process. By 
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0935, the four leading British ships had come into range, so Beatty ordered a distribution of fire 
against the four German ships. However, confusion onboard Tiger led to that ship engaging 
Seydlitz instead of Moltke, as had been intended. This allowed the latter to fire on the British 
without interference by return gunfire.
 153
 Shortly thereafter, Lion scored a serious hit on Seydlitz; 
a 13.5-inch shell penetrated the rearmost barbette and exploded inside. Most of the propellant 
charges caught fire, which rapidly spread into the adjacent turret through an open connecting 
door. The fire burned out both turrets and killed the majority of their crews. The magazines were 
flooded to prevent an ammunition explosion.
154 
 
 Some twenty minutes later, Seydlitz and Derfflinger concentrated their fire on Lion and 
scored several hits that put the vessel out of action. An 11-inch shell from Seydlitz knocked out 
two of Lion's three generators, while a pair of 12-inch shells from Derfflinger struck Lion at the 
waterline and disabled the port engine. At 10:48, Indomitable finally came into range; Beatty 
ordered it to finish off the battered Blücher, while he intended to continue pursuing the three 
German battlecruisers. To his consternation, Lion's last generator failed, its speed dropped to 15 
knots, and it rapidly began to fall behind; in an attempt to regain control over the situation, 
Beatty hoisted the signal "Engage the enemy's rear." The signal "Course north-east" still flew on 
Lion's masthead, which confused Rear Admiral Moore, who interpreted it to mean he should 
concentrate on Blücher
 
.
155
 This allowed Hipper and his three battlecruisers to escape, though at 
the cost of having to sacrifice Blücher.
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Appendix II: Shell deficiencies 
Throughout the course of the Battle of Jutland, armor-piercing large-caliber British shells struck 
the heavy armor of the surviving German battlecruisers twelve times.
157
 Of these twelve hits, 
eight were 12-inch shells and four were 15-inch shells; only one of the twelve—a 15-inch hit on 
Derfflinger's 10.25-inch barbette armor at a range of 9,000 yards—managed to penetrate the 
heavy armor. This was to a limited extent a result of the thickness of the German armor: as 
ranges increase, the penetrative abilities of shells decrease. The primary reason British shells 
failed to function properly was the poor quality of the armor-piercing (AP) shells. 
 Seydlitz was hit three times in the 12-inch thick belt armor by 12-inch shells, at ranges of 
between 9,500 and 11,000 yards; the first broke up on impact and the other two exploded 
prematurely. The latter two holed the armor but their effects were largely outside of the ship. The 
10-inch thick armor on one of Seydlitz's main battery turrets was also struck by a 15-inch shell at 
19,000 yards; this shell burst on impact, and though it did hole the armor, its explosive effects 
were mostly kept out of the turret. Moltke was hit twice on the 10.75-inch belt armor by 15-inch 
shells at a range of 15,500 and 16,500 yards. Both shells failed to penetrate and instead exploded 
on contact with the ship. Derfflinger was hit six times: two hits on the 12-inch belt armor, one on 
the 12-inch conning tower armor, twice on the 10-inch side armor, and the previously mentioned 
hit on the barbette. These hits occurred at ranges between 8,500 and 12,500 yards. The two belt 
hits exploded on contact with minimal effect; the conning tower hit either shattered or exploded 
on impact without result, and the two hits on side armor failed to perform satisfactorily. There 
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was a thirteenth shell hit on the 14-inch belt armor of the battleship Grosser Kurfürst, though it 
too exploded on impact without holing the armor.
158
 
 Two of the 12-inch shells—the conning tower hit on Derfflinger and the second hit on 
Seydlitz's main belt—hit their targets at ranges beyond those at which they could be expected to 
defeat the thickness of armor they struck. Although the other two hits on Seydlitz's belt failed to 
pierce the armor, they performed well, given that they too struck on the upper limits of their 
penetrative capabilities.
159
 The rest of the British shells were within their capabilities. The failure 
of the 15-inch shell that struck  Seydlitz's starboard wing turret is particularly indicative of the 
problematic nature of British armor-piercing shells. 
 The problem with British shells is even more clearly demonstrated by the hits made on 
the thinner 6 to 9 inch medium armor. There were seventeen large-caliber hits on German 
medium armor; one 13.5-inch projectile was deflected and two shells—one 12-inch and one 15-
inch—both hit obliquely and shattered on impact. Eleven hits detonated without fully penetrating 
the armor; five of these burst outside the plate and six exploded after partially penetrating. The 
effects of the former group were completely outside the ships, while the latter group holed the 
armor with limited effects inside the ships. The last three shells blew up after partially 
penetrating, with most of their effects inside. Only three of the seventeen hits—a pair of 13.5-
inch shells and a 15-inch projectile effectively penetrated the medium armor and exploded 
inside.
160
 
 Tests conducted by the Royal Navy in 1914 before the outbreak of war demonstrated the 
failings of the British armor-piercing shells. The Royal Navy found during the tests that the AP 
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shells could not reliably penetrate heavy armor, even at close ranges where the angle of impact 
was nearly head-on. At long ranges, where the angle of impact neared 30 degrees from normal, 
the AP shells were prone to disintegration on even 6 to 8 inch plating. However, the tests did not 
reveal that this tendency occurred at even lower angles of impact.
161
 The fragility of British 
shells was compounded by the use of lyddite as the detonator. The lyddite bursters frequently 
detonated on or shortly after impact from the concussion effect of striking armor plate; this 
prevented the shells from penetrating as intended.
162
 Inexplicably, the Royal Navy failed to 
address these deficiencies until after Jutland. 
 German shells, in contrast, were much more effective. There was only one hit on British 
heavy armor, by an 11-inch shell from Von der Tann on the belt of the battleship Barham. The 
shell failed to penetrate, but the hit was made at a range of approximately 17,000 yards, well 
outside of the performance envelope for a shell of that caliber.
163
 Four hits were made on 9-inch 
armor in surviving British ships: a 12-inch shell that pierced one of Princess Royal's main battery 
barbettes, a 12-inch shell that destroyed Lion's "Q" turret, an 11-inch shell from Moltke that 
penetrated Tiger's "X" barbette, and another 11-inch shell that hit Tiger's belt but failed to pierce 
the armor, though this last hit may have been at too great a range. The hit on Tiger's "X" barbette 
was an example of exceptional performance, as the hit was made at a range of around 13,500 
yards, which was near the theoretical limit for an 11-inch shell to penetrate this thickness of 
armor.
164
 British 7–8 inch armor was hit three times; armor of this thickness was a penetrated by 
a 12-inch shell, holed but not fully pierced by an 11-inch shell, while another 11-inch shell was 
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ineffective. There were ten hits on 6-inch armor, of which six—four 12-inch and two 11-inch 
shells—penetrated, and four—three 12-inch and one 11-inch—did not.165 
 The tendency of British shells to either break up on impact or explode prematurely 
pushed the balance of power even further in favor of their German rivals. Due to the comparative 
lack of gunnery training, the British ships were much less accurate than their German opponents. 
When the fragile and unstable British shells did hit, they were much less likely to deal serious 
damage. The German shells, on the other hand, performed quite well, even at the upper limits of 
their penetrative capabilities. 
 The deficiency of the British shells was compounded by the differences in the propellant 
charges and the manner in which they were handled by both sides. The practice of storing as 
many shells and charges as possible in the gun turrets of British battlecruisers, coupled with the 
fact that the propellant charges were stored in highly flammable silk bags, effectively turned the 
turrets into powder kegs waiting for an errant flame. Conversely, propellant charges aboard 
German warships were stored in brass cartridges, which were much more resistant to flash fires. 
This resilience, along with the German practice to avoid over-filling their main batteries with 
ammunition, rendered the German battlecruisers less prone to catastrophic ammunition fires. As 
a result, the more effective German shells could quickly cause fatal damage to their targets; this 
heavily advantaged the German fleet, and all but ensured the lopsided outcome of the 
battlecruiser engagements. 
 Following the Battle of Jutland, the Royal Navy examined the AP shells and discovered 
the deficiencies in the lyddite bursters. By the summer of 1918, new, more effective "greenboy" 
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rounds were delivered to the fleet. The new fuse installed in these shells used a mixture of 60 
percent lyddite and 40 percent dinitrophenol (DNP), known as shellite, which provided a much 
more stable detonator.
166
 When the German fleet was scuttled in 1919, the battleship Baden was 
the only capital ship the Royal Navy managed to beach and prevent from sinking. In 1921, the 
ship was expended as a gunnery target after a pair of tests that examined new versions of the 
shellite-filled 15-inch AP rounds.
167
 The majority of the shells were fitted with a fuse composed 
of a mixture of 70 percent lyddite and 30 percent DNP.
168
  
 The first test took place on 2 February 1921; the monitor HMS Terror fired seventeen 15-
inch shells into the ship. Of these, five were Common Piercing, Capped (CPC), ten were AP, and 
two were Semi-Armor Piercing, Capped (SAPC); all of the AP and SAPC shells used the new 
70/30 mixture of shellite.
169
 The 10-inch thick main belt was hit twice, both by AP shells. The 
fuze detonated prematurely in the first instance, which allowed the torpedo bulkhead to absorb 
the explosion. The second penetrated the armor and caused significant damage inside the ship. 
Baden's gun turrets and barbettes were targeted as well; an AP shell penetrated the forward 
superfiring turret, while a SAPC failed to do so. Two CPC shells were fired at this turret: one 
holed the roof but failed to penetrate completely, while the other burst on the barbette. The rear 
superfiring turret was hit three times on the roof, by two AP and one CPC shells. All three failed 
to penetrate, though an AP shell penetrated the barbette. An AP shell burst on the conning tower 
without penetrating the heavy armor. The remainder of the shells were fired at medium armor, all 
of which caused significant explosion damage.
170
 From this test, the Royal Navy concluded that 
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the AP shells were satisfactory, while the CPC shells should be reserved for lightly armored 
targets.
171
 
 A second round of tests was conducted on 10 August 1921, during which fourteen 15-
inch shells were fired. These included new versions of the CPC shells, which incorporated the 
new 70/30 shellite detonator. The test was designed to examine the efficiency of the three types 
of shells against less well-protected areas of the ship, so most of these shells were fired at the 
ship's superstructure. One AP shell did hit the thickest section, however—13.25 inches deep—of 
belt armor. This shell failed to penetrate and exploded on impact.
172
 The Admiralty concluded 
after both tests that the new AP shell was satisfactory, while the SAPC shell should be 
abandoned, since it had no real advantage over the AP shell.
173
 
 These AP shells were then put into production for the fleet.
174
 In the few surface 
engagements fought by British capital ships during World War II, these shells performed 
markedly better than their predecessors had at Jutland. British battleships engaged German heavy 
units twice during the war: the interception and sinking of the Bismarck in May 1941 and the 
Battle of North Cape on 26 November 1943. Two surface battles also took place in the 
Mediterranean: the Battle of Calabria on 9 July 1940 and the Battle of Cape Matapan on 27–29 
March 1941. The new British armor-piercing shells allowed the Royal Navy to silence two 
powerful German commerce raiders and establish dominance in the Mediterranean. 
 Two British battleships, the 16-inch armed Rodney and the 14-inch gunned King George 
V  engaged the German battleship Bismarck. During the battle, Bismarck had its two forward gun 
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turrets destroyed by 16-inch shells from Rodney, and a third shell, from either Rodney or King 
George V struck the rear superfiring turret and disabled it. Shells from the two British battleships 
wreaked havoc on the German ship, though only one 16-inch shell penetrated the vessel's 13-
inch thick belt armor.
175
 This was due to the fact that the British ships had closed the range 
significantly; the short range flattened the trajectories of the shells and caused many of them to 
bounce on the surface of the water before striking Bismarck.
176
 The engagement between the 
battleships Duke of York and Scharnhorst in December 1943 produced similar results. A 14-inch 
shell from Duke of York disabled Scharnhorst's forward-most turret; another shell penetrated 
Scharnhorst's thinner upper belt and exploded in a boiler room, which significantly reduced the 
ship's speed and contributed to its eventual sinking.
177
 
 At the Battle of Calabria, the battleships Warspite and Malaya, veterans of Jutland from 
the 5th Battle Squadron, engaged the Italian battleships Giulio Cesare and Conte di Cavour. 
Warspite scored one hit with its 15-inch guns on Giulio Cesare, which reduced the latter's speed 
to 18 knots. This prompted the Italian withdrawal, which permitted the safe passage of several 
British convoys to Alexandria.
178
A year later, in March 1941, Warspite, Barham, and Valiant 
attacked two Italian cruisers in ferocious night fighting at the Battle of Cape Matapan. The 
battleships' 15-inch rounds shattered the Italian cruisers, which were then left to be finished off 
by British destroyers. This action further pushed the balance of power in the Mediterranean in 
favor of the British.
179
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Appendix III: Long-range gunnery 
The British shooting in the initial phase of Jutland was atrocious. Visibility did indeed favor the 
Germans during the run to the south and the subsequent turn north, but poor visibility for the 
British during this segment of the engagement is not a valid explanation for the bad performance 
of Beatty's gunners on its own. This is clearly evident, as the gunners of the British 5th Battle 
Squadron achieved much better results under nearly identical conditions.
180
 Much debate also 
has been made over the decision to adopt the Dreyer system over the Argo developed by Arthur 
Pollen, but this dispute isn't as important as Jon Tetsuro Sumida, a critic of the Dreyer tables, and 
others suggest.
181
 The British battlecruisers' poor shooting resulted primarily from inadequate 
training of the crew, not the gun-laying equipment they used or the conditions in which it was 
operated. 
 This situation is best illustrated by examining and comparing the three British 
battlecruiser squadrons. The squadrons were stationed in Rosyth, which had no areas suitable to 
conduct long-range gunnery training.
182
 Indeed, by the outbreak of World War I, little work had 
been done to ready the location as a major fleet anchorage.
183
 After the poor showing at the 
Battle of Dogger Bank in January 1915, the Royal Navy decided to rotate the squadrons through 
the main naval base at Scapa Flow, which did have long-range firing ranges.
 184
  
 In the six months prior to Jutland, the three battlecruiser squadrons only managed to 
complete one rotation apiece to Scapa Flow;
185
 indeed, when the Royal Navy deployed to meet 
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the Germans, the 3rd Battlecruiser Squadron was still temporarily assigned to the Grand Fleet to 
conduct its gunnery practice.
186
 Conversely, the Germans regularly detached ships from the High 
Seas Fleet to conduct gunnery training. The ships needed only make the short journey from their 
North Sea bases to Brunsbüttel and then pass through the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal to Kiel to utilize 
the gunnery ranges established there.
187
  
 For those ships that remained in Rosyth, the only training afforded the gun crews was 
speed-loading exercises. This was another practice that Beatty implemented after Dogger Bank. 
The training emphasized rapidity of fire, which Beatty felt had been insufficient compared to his 
German opponents at Dogger Bank. Speed-loading directed the crews to store as many shells and 
propellant charges as possible in the gun turrets in order to increase the rate of fire, instead of 
keeping them in the armored magazines.
 188
  
 At the end of 1915, Admiral Jellicoe, concerned over the recent poor gunnery 
performance of the battlecruiser squadron that had just rotated through Scapa Flow, wrote to 
Beatty to address the issue. They agreed that the problem lay with the lack of practice of the fire 
control personnel, and in particular the range-finder operators. Indeed, the performance of HMS 
Tiger was so abysmal during its round of gunnery training that her captain was censured.
189
 
Jellicoe cautioned Beatty to focus on improving accuracy instead of rate of fire, stating that, "the 
rapidity idea was carried to excess."
 190
  Beatty replied that he intended to use the next rotation 
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through Scapa Flow to practice firing drills even faster, arguing that, "concentration is a 
luxury—whereas rapidity is the life and death matter."191  
 The arrival of Rear Admiral Horace Hood's three Invincible class ships of the 3rd 
Battlecruiser Squadron later in the Battle of Jutland dramatically improved the performance of 
the British battlecruisers. The three ships entered the battle from the northeast, with their German 
opponents to the west-southwest.
192
 The combatants were then in opposite positions vis a vis the 
setting sun: it was the Germans' turn to be silhouetted against the horizon while the three British 
ships were obscured in the gathering darkness.
193
 At around the same time, visibility for the 
Germans in the direction of Beatty's forces had significantly declined. Kapitän zur See von 
Egidy, the commanding officer aboard Seydlitz, later stated, "visibility had gradually become 
very unfavorable. There was a dense mist, so that as a rule only the flashes of the enemy's guns, 
but not the ships themselves, could be seen."
194
 Even still, the exchange of hits between the 
British and German forces merely broke even. Including both the German High Seas Fleet and 
the British 5th Battle Squadron, the Germans scored 18 hits, while the British made 19. Of these, 
11 of the German hits were made by Hipper's battlecruisers, while only one was scored by 
Beatty's battlecruisers.
195
 
 Over the course of the entire battle, the 1st and 2nd Squadrons scored hits with only 1.43 
percent of the heavy-caliber shells they fired,
 196
 the worst of which was HMS New Zealand, 
which managed only two or three hits out of 422 shells fired, which amounted to at best .7 
percent.
197
 In contrast, the 3rd Squadron achieved 4.29 percent hits, the best sustained 
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performance by any unit in the Grand Fleet.
198
 While the favorable visibility conditions certainly 
did play a role, it was at most a contributing issue, not the central factor of the long-range 
gunnery question. Likewise, though the choice of fire directing equipment unquestionably had a 
role in determining the efficiency of Beatty's ships, it was not as critical as many would suggest. 
All three ships of the 3rd Squadron were equipped with Dreyer tables, as were the rest of 
Beatty's ships, with the exception of Queen Mary, which had an Argo Clock Mark IV.
199
 It is 
important to note that Queen Mary had the highest accuracy of shot of the six ships assigned to 
Beatty, up until it was destroyed.
200
 Regardless, it was the Dreyer-equipped Invincible that sank 
Lützow, the only capital ship sunk by heavy-caliber gunfire alone in the course of the battle.
201
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